scope of a secure and democratic Europe, and to the ability of the America and Europe to work together in promoting international security.

European instability, which is inherently more likely should we fail to extend Alliance membership to the democracies of Central Europe, portends to be the greatest of drains upon U.S. defense resources, energy, and effort. This has already proven to be the case in Bosnia. We must take the pro-active steps necessary to consolidate and widen the zone of security and, thus, peace and stability in Europe. NATO enlargement is the most effective step we can take toward this end.

Third, these Senate hearings have constructively and aggressively addressed concerns that have been voiced about the potential impact of NATO enlargement upon Russia's future.

Testimony from Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, our former Ambassador to Moscow, emphasized that NATO enlargement has not produced a revanchist Russian foreign policy nor undercut democracy in Russia. In fact, let me quote directly form Ambassador Pickering's testimony.

He stated:

Over the last 18 months, precisely, when NATO enlargement has been a salient point of our agenda, Russian reform and security cooperation have moved forward, not backward.

This former ambassador to Russia added that in the course of NATO enlargement, Yeltsin was reelected as Russia's president and that since then he has elevated reformers in his government. Moreover, Yeltsin has appointed a new defense minister, one who publicly supports START II. Most importantly, last May Russia signed the Founding Act, an agreement that offers an unprecedented opportunity for a new era of cooperation and partnership between the Alliance and Russia.

Mr. President, too many times this year Congress has been accused of paying inadequate attention to the policy of NATO enlargement. The fact is that Congress has aggressively addressed this matter. Congress has not only been engaged in this policy its bipartisan leadership on this matter has actually been a catalyst of action.

Much commendation is due to the Senate leadership and the Chamber as a whole for the sustained attention that has been directed to the many facets of this issue. The amount of consultation that has occurred between the administration and Congress makes NATO enlargement a model of how to approach the executive-legislative dimension of U.S. security policy.

I fully recognize that our deliberations on NATO enlargement are far from over. More hearings are sure to be held on this important policy, as they should be. However, I thought it important to highlight the tremendously effective efforts that this Chamber has already directed to this matter of national security.

SENATOR BIDEN'S NATO SPEECH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, our colleague, Senator JOE BIDEN, addressed the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council, the so called NAC, during their visit to the United States last month. His speech was an impressive overview of the state of debate here in the United States on NATO enlargement and how that debate is being affected the debate in Europe on issues of transatlantic security. Among these are, of course, the effort to foster reconciliation and peace in the Balkans.

The next coming months will feature a number of important events concerning NATO enlargement, including the NAC ministerial in mid-December which will yield protocols of accession into NATO for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Keeping in mind the debate that we will have early next year on NATO enlargement, I encourage my colleagues to read Senator BINDEN's statement. It is one that should also be closely read by our colleagues in the executive branch.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator BIDEN's outstanding speech on NATO enlargement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RATIFICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT BY THE U.S. SENATE

(By Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)

I am honored by the invitation of the North Atlantic Council to share my thoughts on the American side of one of the most important foreign policy decisions that our alliance has faced for many decades: ratification of the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

First, let me make clear that I am a strong proponent of NATO enlargement. In the interest of brevity, and because there is no need to persuade this audience, I will not go into the details of my rationale.

Let me just say I believe the case for enlargement is overwhelmingly persuasive. First, it is my belief that the inclusion of the three aforementioned countries—if they meet all of NATO's rigid political, military, and economic criteria—would strengthen the alliance and enhance the security of the United States.

Second, the consequences if we fail to act are equally serious. The history of the twentieth century has taught us that if the United States distances itself from European affairs, the result on the continent is instability leading to chaos. Ultimately, dealing with the instability and chaos will cost far more in blood and treasure than the initial costs of staying engaged.

Finally, there is the moral factor. As Secretary of State Albright noted in her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

What possible justification can there be for confirming the old cold war division of Europe by freezing out the new democracies east of Germany?

As most of you know, according to the U.S. Constitution, international treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds majority in the Senate. In this case, we would be ratifying an amendment to the Treaty of Washington of 1949. As the Democratic party's chief foreign policy spokesman in the Senate, I have the responsibility to lead the fight for ratification.

Despite what I believe to be the overwhelming logic for NATO enlargement, ratification will not be easy—it will not be a ''slam dunk,'' as we say in this country. It will be considered, not only in the context of national security policy, but in the context of domestic politics.

And in the context of our debate about engagement versus isolationism. I know most of you are primarily concerned with military matters. But I hope you will convey to the civilian and political leaders in each of your countries the kinds of issues that could derail ratification in the U.S. Senate—to the detriment of all of us.

My principal reasons for being cautious about NATO enlargement revolve around two sides of the same issue: burden-sharing. The first side relates to sharing the costs of NATO enlargement; the second side relates to sharing the military duties in Bosnia.

Contrary to assertions by some European politicians, these cost and burden-sharing issues are not superficial problems. They have direct relevance, not only to the ratification of enlargement, but also to the kind of alliance we will have in the 21st century.

First the costs. There has been a good deal of publicity in the United States about three widely differing cost estimates of NATO enlargement. NATO's own cost-estimate—mandated by the North Atlantic Council at last July's Madrid summit—will not be known until just before the December NATO ministerial. So any firm predictions about how that will come out would be risky and premature.

Nonetheless, the latest estimate from the Clinton administration, offered this week in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, was somewhat reassuring. It appears that the NATO estimate may be somewhat lower than the Pentagon's earlier study because only three—not four—countries are to be added to the alliance, and some of their militaries are in a bit better shape than previously thought.

Whatever the final numbers, the atmospherics of the debate over cost-sharing since Madrid have been damaging to Trans-Atlantic solidarity. Public statements from West European leaders that their countries should not—or even will not—pay any additional costs for enlargement given potent ammunition both to neo-isolationists in the U.S. Senate and to those who favor engagement but who have legitimate questions about costs.

Although there have been many warnings in the United States about the possibly huge costs of NATO enlargement, to my knowledge not a single American politician has said that we will not pay our share if enlargement is ratified. Yet when European leaders—before even waiting for the official NATO cost-study to come out in December—threaten not to pay even one additional franc or mark for enlargement, it is waving a red flag in front of my colleagues in the Senate.

Many of my fellow Senators are aware of the fact that West Europeans face competing priorities. We know that the eleven European NATO members who are also members of the European Union are currently engaged in painful budget cutting in order to meet the criteria for a single currency, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 1999. And we are aware that Germany and others are insisting that those countries who qualify be held to rigid fiscal discipline thereafter through a so-called ''stability pact'' without ''political'' criteria.

We do not underestimate the political stakes: resentment against this belt-tightening played a key role in the defeat of President Chirac's coalition in the French national elections last June and in the one-day temporary fall of Prime Minister Prodi's government in Italy earlier this month. Several other EU member states have also seen anti-austerity demonstrations.

As a politician, I empathize with the challenge my European parliamentary colleagues face. But we all have to make difficult choices. For example, in my country after years of spirited debate we have finally agreed upon a plan to balance the Federal budget by the year 2002. In fact, by having taken extremely painful measures like reducing the civilian Federal workforce by more than a quarter-million individuals we may reach a balanced budget even earlier.

So however difficult it may be, if you—our European allies—want continued American involvement in your security, to use a baseball metaphor, your governments will have to ''step up to the plate.'' Let me be as frank as I possibly can: Americans simply must not be led to believe that our European allies will cut corners on NATO in order to fulfill their obligations to the European union.

Let me go one step further, if NATO is to remain a vibrant organization with the United States playing a lead role, when the alliance cost figures are issued in December, the non-U.S. members must join the United States in declaring their willingness to assume their fair share of direct enlargement costs.

This includes developing the power projection capabilities to which all alliance members agreed in the ''strategic concept'' in 1991, before enlargement was even being seriously discussed. The flexibility afforded by these power projection enhancements are central to NATO's ability to carry out its expanded, new mission—to defend our common ideals beyond our borders, while we continue to carry out the core function of defending the territory of alliance members.

Some of our European allies—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, in particular—are making strides in improving the deployability and sustainability of their forces. But neither their forces, nor those of the rest of our European partners, are as yet fully deployable.

If our European partners were not to meet these force-projection obligations—and it was this part of the Pentagon study that occasioned the loudest criticism from across the Atlantic—the United States would continue to possess the only fully deployable and sustainable land and air forces in the alliance and would therefore be cast in the permanent role of ''the good gendarme of Europe''—a role that neither the American people, nor the Senate of the United States, would accept.

I also would like to comment on the recent call by some West European defense ministers for counting economic assistance to Central and Eastern Europe as a substitute for meeting their countries' current alliance commitments and their future share of enlargement costs. Their proposal makes no sense and is totally counter-productive.

First of all, European statistics on economic assistance typically include healthy components of export credits, tied aid, and investment, making alleged comparisons with U.S. assistance one of ''apples versus oranges.'' Thus, the difference in the amount of economic aid from Western Europe and from the United States is less significant than some European politicians would have us believe.

Second, even if Western European economic assistance to the East since 1990 has exceeded our own, it would be unwise to consider these contributions as a substitute for obligations related to NATO's military budget: it would only reinforce the ''European businessman''/''American gendarme'' syndrome. It would widen the military gap between the U.S. and the continent and, not unintentionally, give a comparative advantage to Western European companies in dealing with the East on the economic front. We in the United States simply won't play that game.

Third, and most importantly, such substitution arguments are ultimately self-defeating for Europe. As many of my Senate colleagues are eager to point out, if Western Europe claims security credit for its economic assistance to Eastern Europe, then the United States can justifiably claim credit for its worldwide containment of the threat of nuclear proliferation, for keeping international sea lanes open, and for guaranteeing continued access to Middle East oil.

To be blunt: I don't think you want us to play that game, because we can win it hands down.

The real point is that burden-sharing is not a book-keeping exercise. We would all do well to restrict the NATO burden-sharing discussion to just that—military burden-sharing in the alliance.

One other point related to comparative spending on defense: above and beyond enlargement and power-projection capability, unless you—our European allies—significantly upgrade your militaries, particularly in gathering and real-time processing of information, a ''strategic disconnect'' between a technologically superior United States military and outdated Western European militaries will eventually make it impossible for NATO to function effectively. From several personal conversations, I believe that this is a worry that many of you share.

There is a second dark cloud looming on the horizon of Trans-Atlantic relations. In the spring of 1998, just when the U.S. Senate is likely to be voting on amending the Treaty of Washington to accept new members, American SFOR ground forces are scheduled to be completing their withdrawal from Bosnia.

As it now stands, our European NATO allies will follow suit, in line with their ''in together, out together'' policy, despite a U.S. offer to make our air, naval, communications, and intelligence assets available to a European-led follow-on force, with an American rapid reaction force on standby alert ''over the horizon'' in Hungary or Italy.

My colleagues in the Senate have listened carefully as some European NATO members, led by France, call for more European leadership in the alliance and for a sturdier ''European pillar'' in NATO. But when they hear those same European voices say they will refuse to maintain troops in Bosnia without U.S. participation, it sounds like unfair burden-sharing and it only reinforces their doubts about NATO itself. After all, if Bosnia is the prototypical crisis the alliance will face in the next century, and internal squabbling prevents it from dealing effectively with Bosnia now, even staunch NATO supporters will be hard-pressed to defend its continued relevance.

France's position on Bosnia is particularly irritating when one considers its insistence on European command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, the home of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. No matter how Paris tries to dress it up, this demand is perceived by U.S. Senators as a gratuitous poke in the eye. Not only is this idea a non-starter, it simply poisons the Trans-Atlantic atmosphere.

As many of you may know, I have been deeply involved in our policy toward Bosnia since 1991. My own personal view is that it was unwise to have set a June 1998 date for SFOR's withdrawal and that the United States should agree to a scaled-down ground force in Bosnia beyond that date, with Europeans comprising the overwhelming majority of the ground forces. In short, a C.J.T.F. (combined joint task force), but one in which the United States has at least some forces present in all its components.

But whatever the final mix of post-SFOR forces, it is essential that we settle this issue this fall in order for an orderely redeployment to take place and to clear the air for the parliamentary debates on NATO enlargement. Time is running short.

Let me sum up by giving you my prognosis for ratification of NATO enlargement in the U.S. Senate. The debate has already begun and will continue to be lively. In the end, I believe it will be very difficult for most of my colleagues to vote against admitting the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians if the final accession negotiations reveal that they are qualified for membership.

But I also believe that unless the United States quickly comes to a satisfactory burden-sharing understanding with our European and Canadian allies, the future of NATO in the next century will be very much in doubt.

In that context, an advance European declaration of willingness to share fairly in the enlargement costs that NATO will announce in December, and a spirit of compromise on a post-SFOR force for Bosnia, would considerably enhance the chances for ratification of NATO enlargement by the U.S. Senate.

Together we can enlarge and strengthen NATO, but only if we fairly share the burden of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Thursday, November 6, 1997, the Federal debt stood at $5,431,079,031,652.94 (Five trillion, four hundred thirty-one billion, seventy-nine million, thirty-one thousand, six hundred fifty-two dollars and ninety-four cents).

One year ago, November 6, 1996, the Federal debt stood at $5,245,748,000,000 (Five trillion, two hundred forty-five billion, seven hundred forty-eight million).

Five years ago, November 6, 1992, the Federal debt stood at $4,087,224,000,000 (Four trillion, eighty-seven billion, two hundred twenty-four million).

Ten years ago, November 6, 1987, the Federal debt stood at $2,396,279,000,000 (Two trillion, three hundred ninety-six billion, two hundred seventy-nine million).

Twenty-five years ago, November 6, 1972, the Federal debt stood at $435,570,000,000 (Four hundred thirty-five billion, five hundred seventy million) which reflects a debt increase of nearly $5 trillion—$4,995,509,031,652.94 (Four trillion, nine hundred ninety-five billion, five hundred nine million, thirty-one thousand, six hundred fifty-two dollars and ninety-four cents) during the past 25 years.